Coinsurance vs. co-payments: Reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers.
Copayments
Ex post moral hazard
Health insurance competition
Imperfect competition
Journal
Journal of health economics
ISSN: 1879-1646
Titre abrégé: J Health Econ
Pays: Netherlands
ID NLM: 8410622
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
07 2022
07 2022
Historique:
received:
10
06
2021
revised:
25
02
2022
accepted:
24
05
2022
pubmed:
17
6
2022
medline:
14
7
2022
entrez:
16
6
2022
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals differ in their severity of illness and there is ex postmoral hazard. We consider two regimes: one in which insurers use coinsurance rates (ad valorem reimbursements) and one in which insurers use co-payments (specific reimbursements). We show that the induced equilibrium with co-payments involves a lower producer price and a higher level of welfare for consumers even though it may imply a larger consumer price. This result provides strong support for a reference price based reimbursement policy.
Identifiants
pubmed: 35709565
pii: S0167-6296(22)00061-3
doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102642
pii:
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Pagination
102642Informations de copyright
Copyright © 2022. Published by Elsevier B.V.