Stingy bots can improve human welfare in experimental sharing networks.
Journal
Scientific reports
ISSN: 2045-2322
Titre abrégé: Sci Rep
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101563288
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
20 10 2023
20 10 2023
Historique:
received:
01
07
2023
accepted:
12
10
2023
medline:
1
11
2023
pubmed:
21
10
2023
entrez:
20
10
2023
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Machines powered by artificial intelligence increasingly permeate social networks with control over resources. However, machine allocation behavior might offer little benefit to human welfare over networks when it ignores the specific network mechanism of social exchange. Here, we perform an online experiment involving simple networks of humans (496 participants in 120 networks) playing a resource-sharing game to which we sometimes add artificial agents (bots). The experiment examines two opposite policies of machine allocation behavior: reciprocal bots, which share all resources reciprocally; and stingy bots, which share no resources at all. We also manipulate the bot's network position. We show that reciprocal bots make little changes in unequal resource distribution among people. On the other hand, stingy bots balance structural power and improve collective welfare in human groups when placed in a specific network position, although they bestow no wealth on people. Our findings highlight the need to incorporate the human nature of reciprocity and relational interdependence in designing machine behavior in sharing networks. Conscientious machines do not always work for human welfare, depending on the network structure where they interact.
Identifiants
pubmed: 37864003
doi: 10.1038/s41598-023-44883-0
pii: 10.1038/s41598-023-44883-0
pmc: PMC10589225
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
17957Informations de copyright
© 2023. Springer Nature Limited.
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