Public welfare donation, rent sharing, and income gap within enterprises.
Journal
PloS one
ISSN: 1932-6203
Titre abrégé: PLoS One
Pays: United States
ID NLM: 101285081
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2024
2024
Historique:
received:
01
01
2023
accepted:
10
08
2024
medline:
5
9
2024
pubmed:
5
9
2024
entrez:
5
9
2024
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
This study utilizes data from A-share listed companies between 2011 and 2020 to empirically investigate the impact and mechanism of public welfare donations on the internal income gap of enterprises. The research findings indicate that public welfare donations significantly increase the per capita salary of management, while their impact on the per capita salary of ordinary employees is not significant, thus leading to an expansion of the internal income gap within enterprises. The results from mechanism testing reveal that the income tax benefits resulting from charitable donations and the rise in corporate operating income have contributed to an increase in excess rent shared by enterprises and employees. Due to a stronger bargaining power, management shares more excess rents, thereby widening the income gap within the enterprise. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that public welfare donations have a greater impact on the internal income gap of non-state-owned enterprises; however, limiting executive compensation and enhancing employees' bargaining power can mitigate this widening effect caused by public welfare donations on enterprise's internal income gap. The research value of this study is threefold. Firstly, there is a scarcity of studies on the impact of public welfare donations on the income gap within enterprises, and this study contributes to enriching the research in this area. Secondly, this paper examines the effect of tax incentives for public welfare donations on the internal income gap of enterprises, thereby deepening the research on the impact of tax reduction and fee reduction, as well as expanding our understanding of corporate income tax preferential policies. Thirdly, it offers insights into improving enterprise compensation systems and enhancing corporate governance. Senior executives can potentially allocate more excess rent through their strong bargaining power. If their compensation remains unrestricted, it may lead to a widening internal income gap and negatively affect company operational efficiency.
Identifiants
pubmed: 39236036
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0309387
pii: PONE-D-23-00002
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
e0309387Informations de copyright
Copyright: © 2024 Chen et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.