Protecting whose welfare? A document analysis of competition regulatory decisions in four jurisdictions across three harmful consumer product industries.
Commercial determinants of health
Competition policy
Consumer welfare
Health in all policies
Industrial epidemics
Market power
Journal
Globalization and health
ISSN: 1744-8603
Titre abrégé: Global Health
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101245734
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
02 Oct 2024
02 Oct 2024
Historique:
received:
28
06
2024
accepted:
20
09
2024
medline:
3
10
2024
pubmed:
3
10
2024
entrez:
2
10
2024
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Competition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified. We identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa's competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including 'Black Economic Empowerment' and potential harms to workers. Many of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public's health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND AND METHODS
METHODS
Competition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified.
RESULTS
RESULTS
We identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa's competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including 'Black Economic Empowerment' and potential harms to workers.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSIONS
Many of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public's health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries.
Identifiants
pubmed: 39358716
doi: 10.1186/s12992-024-01076-2
pii: 10.1186/s12992-024-01076-2
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
70Informations de copyright
© 2024. The Author(s).
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