Material-level countermeasures for securing microfluidic biochips.
Journal
Lab on a chip
ISSN: 1473-0189
Titre abrégé: Lab Chip
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101128948
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
26 09 2023
26 09 2023
Historique:
medline:
27
9
2023
pubmed:
22
8
2023
entrez:
22
8
2023
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Flow-based microfluidic biochips (FMBs) have been rapidly commercialized and deployed in recent years for biological computing, clinical diagnostics, and point-of-care-tests (POCTs). However, outsourcing FMBs makes them susceptible to material-level attacks by malicious actors for illegitimate monetary gain. The attacks involve deliberate material degradation of an FMB's polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) components by either doping with reactive solvents or altering the PDMS curing ratio during fabrication. Such attacks are stealthy enough to evade detection and deteriorate the FMB's function. Furthermore, material-level attacks can become prevalent in attacks based on intellectual property (IP) theft, such as counterfeiting, overbuilding,
Substances chimiques
baysilon
63148-62-9
Dimethylpolysiloxanes
0
Fluorescent Dyes
0
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM